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Listening to the Past: Persuasive Stories and the 
Beginning Design Student 
N athaniel Coleman 
Washington State University 
Stories and the Beginning Design Student 
Architecture students tell stories about their work. These sto-
ries are meant to convey information about design philoso-
phy, design intent, and design concept. Such stories are intend-
ed to have something to do with the work students present. 
Often, though, what is said is accepted as valid simply because 
it is said. Closer scrutiny of the relationship between what is 
said and what is presented frequently reveals a wide gap 
between intention (what is said) and result (what is done). 
Incongruity between intention and result encourages a loose 
way of thinking that fosters a separation of thought (theory) 
from doing (practice). Concurrently, beginning design students 
are thought of as requiring skill development above all else. 
Overemphasis on skills, or technique, though, undervalues 
developing conceptual sophistication. If students are not intro-
duced to design as an ill-defined problem, akin to effective and 
persuasive argument, their propensity is to produce work that 
is unfocused, lacking in conceptual sophistication, and ineffec-
tively developed or represented. 
Initiation of beginning students into design culture frequently 
presents architecture as a specialized form of knowledge 
unrelated to what students learn about the world through 
their bodies as they grow up in a culture .This attitude not only 
undervalues lived experience but also sets up conditions 
under which history (listening to the past for what it can tell 
us) is relegated to subject matter isolated from design inven-
tion. An alternative approach views architecture and experi-
ence as linked. History, as cultural memory, confirms this and 
provides an avenue for exploring such a claim. History can 
show beginning design students that listening to the past can 
have relevance for the cultural work they engage in. The past 
offers insight into how people have oriented themselves 
through architecture. 
Cultural memory as a resource for design invention reveals 
persuasiveness-making effective arguments (design projects 
as well as written and spoken project statements)-as a cru-
cial ability for beginning design students. Students will come to 
see the world and care about it only if faculty members show 
them why this is worthwhile. Simply telling students to think 
and experience differently (or to come to this through 
abstract design exercises) has little long-term effect-as the 
built environment often confirms. Coercion based on grading 
may get short-term results but is ultimately of little long-term 
benefrt. Persuasiveness seems to be the key. Persuasion is far 
subtler; and less suspect, than one might at first imagine. After 
all, what other tool do faculty have as they attempt to win 
over the hearts and minds of students to a concern for the 
constructed realm we inhabit? 
How though does my desire that my students engage in 
thoughtful practice (by enacting the interdependence of the-
ory, practice, and history) tally with my primary obligation to 
help them become employable? I think that each of us who 
instruct design students must sort this out for ourselves. But 
what ifTafuri was correct, and the belief that architects ought 
to, or can, engage in meaningful cultural work is a kind of false 
consciousness? 1 Furthermore, what if harboring such a con-
viction and professing it to students only serves to deceive 
them into believing that they will be entering a discipline 
formed by predecessors with whom they share little? As a 
corrective, Tafuri argued that we would serve our students 
best if we assisted them in taking their place as technicians in 
the building industry If Tafuri is correct, as the process and 
results of much building appears to confirm, then architecture 
school ought to become more emphatically vocational and 
technical in its character and aims, which might explain the 
desire to quantify something that is fundamentally qualitative. 
My sense though is that most design school faculty (and their 
students) would be uncomfortable with such a radically 
diminished conception of architecture's potential and cultural 
role. 
If I am correct, how could beginning design more openly 
reflect the tacitly critical position of most design schools and 
their faculty? Especially as they resist the requirements of a 
profession that more and more demands that schools 
become preparatory training grounds for office workers who 
are technicians more than architects in any traditional human-
istic sense. Persuasiveness resists the reduced cultural role of 
architecture. It offers a hopeful dimension in the form of pos-
sible reform; reform based on the conviction that architecture 
might still have an ethical function, which at its most basic is its 
orientating objective (confirmed by work-introduced to us 
from the past- that prepares the ground for human occupa-
tion in all its depth), a conviction beginning design students do 
not (do?) arrive at school with. 
Evaluative Criteria 
Grades are based on quantitative2 data but architecture is 
qualitative.3 A crucial problem for any design faculty and the 
students they teach, especially beginning design students, is 
how to evaluate the character of something with a criterion 
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of number. As a result, the habit is to attempt to quantify abil-
ity. Some things within the micro-culture of a particular design 
faculty do seem open to a kind of quantification, but not many. 
And if the entire design curriculum is subjected to quantifica-
tion, the result will be students who are technically proficient 
rather than poetic. Such a scenario is circular in that it returns 
us to the very problem we set out to address-how to get 
design students to care about design-in fact, it institutional-
izes it. 
Since there is no longer a universal ideal of beauty agreeable 
to even a small group, evaluation of design work must either 
be wholly subjective, thus arbitrary, or some other more 
mobile criterion of judgment, or manner of evaluation, is 
required. But beauty as commonly understood relates to the 
appeal of finished surfaces to the ocular sense alone.This con-
ception of beauty places its relative presence in the eye of the 
beholder and reduces its full potential as a criterion of archi-
tectural quality. A richer conception of beauty derives from 
Socrates and was introduced into architectural theory by 
Alberti. Alberti, after Plato, by way of Socrates, proposes that 
beauty is a sense of wholeness. Wholeness suggests both 
completeness and an interrelationship among parts that 
reveals the very wholeness that beauty suggests. Alberti 
describes beauty as a correlation among parts such that noth-
ing may be added to a body nor taken away from it but for 
the worse.4 Consequently, if beauty is a thicker concept than 
simply describing attractiveness, it might have something to 
offer faculty and the beginning design students they instruct.5 
What I have proposed so far could appear as reactionary, but 
I think such criticism would be premature. For example, even 
the work of an architect attempting to dismantle beauty and _ 
(or as) wholeness is ultimately subject to beauty for evalua-
tion of his or her effort and results. Simply put, if beauty is, as 
Alberti suggested, a sense of wholeness, then even the most 
radical invention is complete-recognizable as a distinct 
body-when it conveys a sense of inevitability; that is, when 
nothing may be added to nor taken away from it but for the 
worse. Beauty conceptualized in this way is a much more 
mobile than fixed concept, allowing for apparently infinite 
inventive potential. It is also a criterion of judgment that offers 
a modicum of reason to what at first appears as a realm of 
subjectivity and arbitrariness, and does· so without reducing 
architecture to a quantified technical exercise. I think it is this 
sense of beauty that Adorno was suggesting in "Functionalism 
Today," when he wrote: 
It lies in the nature of artworks to inquire after the 
essential and necessary in them and to react against all 
superiluous elements. After the critical tradition declined 
to offer the arts a canon of right and wrong, the respon-
sibility to take such considerations into account was 
placed on each individual work; each had to test itself 
against its own immanent logic, whether of not it was 
motivated by some external purpose.6 
Architecture has always had a didactic dimension, housing a 
pattern of life as it is while offering a ground for that pattern 
of life as it might be. Stronger works of architecture, those that 
endure through time by offering a defined ground open to 
perpetual interpretation, are as much products of a given con-
dition as they are settings for transformed conditions. In this 
way. architecture always clues inhabitants in on how they 
might occupy it. In the same way, a design project explains 
itself to reviewers based on the degree to which it reveals its 
own immanent logic by being true to it. This requires that stu-
dio instructors, as much as possible, free themselves from a 
predetermined vision of what a student project should be 
(especially how it should look), and enliven themselves to the 
unique processes and individual potential of each student. It 
requires of students that they consider their thinking and the 
capture of this in the project representations they make as 
something that either is or is not persuasive, in the sense of 
complete, in the sense of inevitable, and in the sense of reveal-
ing an immanent logic that the whole presentation-written, 
oral, and drawn, constructed, or plotted-is true to. 
Beginning design students, though, enter architecture school in 
the midst of a paradox. On the one hand they have learned 
the world with their bodies as they have grown up in a cul-
ture; on the other they, at least most of them, are assumed to 
have no prior knowledge of architecture as a teachable uni-
versity discipline or as a kind of cultural practice (unlike stu-
dents of music performance or composition who do have 
much prior knowledge). As a consequence, much of the edu-
cation of beginning design students is preoccupied with defa-
miliarizing the world they grew up, a process effected espe-
cially through abstraction. The imagined benefit of this is that 
even though a person may spend most of their lives in, among, 
or around constructed environments, they probably have 
always experienced these in distraction without a specialist's 
concern. Consequently, the ethical objective of design educa-
tion-whether stated or not-is to get entering students to 
care about the invented realm they inhabit, will invent, and 
one day will transform with their constructions. On the down-
side, defamiliarization of the world in which students grew up 
and learned through their bodies has the negative potential of 
alienating students from their own experiences of, and nas-
cent convictions about, the constructed world. 
Alienation from prior experience occurs, in part, by way of 
over emphasis on technical skill development, and through 
promotion of architecture as primarily an autonomous disci-
pline. While the idea of competence as predicated on skill 
development, and the mythologizing of architecture may pre-
pare students for professional practice, it de-emphasizes the 
degree to which architecture is a setting for ongoing patterns 
of life that students already know about. Since most students 
grow up in or around urban or suburban sprawl or in and 
around shopping malls, the assumption of many faculty mem-
bers is that the general level of student culture is not high 
enough to assure a level of care for the built environment in 
line with disciplinary expectations. This, though, appears to 
short -circuit the educational process from the outset. If stu-
dents come to care about the built environment according to 
the preconceptions of the faculty they will have a difficult time 
developing their own convictions about it. 
Even though faculty ought to refrain from imposing too much 
on their students from above, they can model for their stu-
dents a high degree of care for the world. If such concern is 
persuasively modeled, beginning design students will come to 
care for the world and the projects they invent to transform 
it. Beyond any marketable skill or technique of design or pro-
duction students may learn, thoughtfulness offers them a real 
possibility to practice their discipline in a meaningful, satisfying, 
and self sustaining way. While all of this may seem obvious 
enough, its qualitative nature runs contrary to a quantifying 
habit. But there may be a way to elaborate criteria that are 
neutral enough to be broadly applicable even as they assist in 
a re-collection of carefulness about architecture. 
Heidegger on the Bridge 
So many attempts at re-collection of thoughtfulness about 
architecture and the world begin with Heidegger (including 
those by Christian Norberg-Shulz, Joseph Rykwert, Kenneth 
Frampton, Karsten Harries, and David Leatherbarrow), that it 
seems reasonable to elaborate on Heidegger in a discussion 
of how beginning design students might begin to advance per-
suasive projects (orally, textually, and visually)? 
In "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger summarizes his 
investigation into the nature of building and dwelling by stat-
ing that" I. Building is really dwelling. 2. Dwelling is the manner 
in which mortals are on the earth. 3. Building as dwel ling 
unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and the 
building that erects buildings."8The first thing that comes to 
mind when reading the above is its strangeness. For the most 
part, we live in distraction, which I think Heidegger must have 
believed was as much symptom as cause of our estrangement 
from things, others, the world, and ourselves. And yet, it is 
through the strangeness of his language that he suggests a 
pathway back to ourselves by unconcealing our attachment to 
things. My interest in Heidegger's summation, though, lies in 
what it offers in terms of suggesting an attitude toward archi-
tecture that faculty could model for beginning design students. 
Beginning with Heidegger's third point, building is how human 
beings prepare a ground for their stay on the earth, relating as 
much to the necessity of food production as to preparation 
of a ground for inhabitation. Kept in mind, this suggests that 
architecture is always preoccupied with establishing a setting 
for life. Such a reading is confirmed by Heidegger's second 
point that we require a place to inhabit during our short stay 
here; a place constructed that shelters, which arises from the 
desire for location, or orientation. Consequently, building, as 
confirmation of human efforts to be located, is really how 
dwelling is attempted, in the sense that in making the world a 
setting is established that houses and sustains life.That is how 
"building is really dwelling (Heidegger's first point)." Often the 
supposed sophistication of the line of reasoning just pursued 
is thought to be beyond the comprehension of beginning 
design students. If it is, what is there to do except default to 
the teaching of measurable skills? Yet preoccupation with 
measurable skills abstracts architecture by diverting student 
attention away from world-making purpose toward architec-
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ture as either quantifiable technical problems or toward inven-
tion of attractive objects unconcerned with the human drama 
they will enclose. Neither does justice either to human desire 
or to human vulnerability. 
By preparing a ground for life, architecture could be said to 
have a permanent function that is always undergoing trans-
formation, in the sense that a ground for life can never be 
established once and for all, even though a ground for life is 
always as much desired as necessary. Students know this 
because they have grown up in a culture. Wanting to be an 
architect, especially with no prior knowledge to explain such 
a strange desire, might actually reveal a preconscious desire to 
make the world a more suitable place for human inhabitation. 
Strangely enough, this desire is less cultivated in architecture 
school than skill development and the overvaluation of novel-
ty are. 
As the activity that prepares a place for inhabitation through 
building, architecture must be more than its technical function 
or its attractive or novel appearance suggests. Heidegger's dis-
cussion of the bridge suggests a way of thinking about design 
that permits it its potential richness, even for beginning design 
students. Heidegger describes the bridge as something multi-
dimensional rather than simply a means of conveyance; in 
doing so he models a fuller sense of architecture by suggest-
ing criteria for project evaluation that takes into account 
developing skills as well as evolving conceptual sophistication. 
For example, beginning design students often represent their 
designs as if they were located nowhere in particular and 
could be placed anywhere in an abstract expanse of unde-
fined space. In contradistinction, Heidegger suggests that "the 
bridge gathers the earth as landscape around the stream" it 
crosses.9 It is human intervention-the bridge-that makes 
the land comprehensible. In this sense, the bridge, or any work 
of architecture, is not simply placed in (or on) an already fully 
formed receiving plot of land; rather; the bridge invents the 
place that receives it. 11 Whether or not students ultimately 
reject the orienting objective of architecture as its ethical func-
tion for some more novel approach, it is reasonable to intro-
duce orientation as a persisting theme of extremely long 
duration. I I Extrapolating from this, demonstration of concern 
for place identification by beginning design students could 
become one of the criteria for evaluating their developing skill 
and conceptual sophistication. As with the definition of beau-
ty suggested above, place identification need not be institu-
tionalized, it can remain open and mobile so long as a stu-
dent's project demonstrates a persuasive interpretation of the 
theme. 
Heidegger goes on to discuss different kinds of bridges, includ-
ing "the city bridge," "the old stone bridge," or "highway 
bridge," each has a specific purpose to fulfill but does so dif-
ferently from each of the other bridges. By listing three kinds 
of bridges with three distinct characters that do three differ-
ent kinds of jobs, Heidegger introduces architectural propriety 
as part of how humans prepare a ground for life. 13 
Appropriateness like beauty or place identification/site inven-
tion is not nearly as rigid or reactionary an evaluative criteri-
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on as rt might first appear. An individual project can elaborate 
its own interpretation of appropriateness when it reveals rts 
own immanent logic by being true to it. 
Each of Heidegger's bridges is appropriate to rts primary func-
tion but in so being each speaks a secondary function. I 3 For 
example, Heidegger describes the "highway bridge" as being 
"tied into the network of long-distance traffic paced and cal-
culated for maximum yield." 14 And highway bridges are appro-
priate to this function, demonstrating this by in fact being 
"paced and calculated for maximum yield," and looking as 
though they are. Such a correlation between bridge and rts 
function is much less the product of a posrtivist "form follows 
function" relationship than rt might at first appear. The high-
way bridge looks like it is built for speed even when traffic is 
at a standstill. That it appears ready to receive a high yie ld of 
fast paced long distance traffic is as much an expression of 
artifice (or desire) as rt is a product of abstract calculations rel-
ative to the actual function of highway bridges. Its very 
abstractness re-presents an abstract desire for speed and dis-
tance, which is necessarily a solvent of place identification-a 
highway bridge wrth "old stone arches" would be inappropri-
ate for representing a cosmology based on speed and 
abstraction. Bridges (as are all human things) are thus convey-
ors of traffic as much as of meaning (content). Heidegger 
touches on this when he proposes that bridges-all bridges, 
though each differently-analogize human pathways through 
life. He writes: 
Now in a high arch, now in a low, the bridge vaults over 
the glen and the stream-whether mortals keep in mind 
this vaulting of the bridge's course or forget that they, 
always themselves on their way to the last bridge, are 
actually striving to surmount all that is common and 
unsound in them. 15 
Heidegger's effort is to call our attention back to the world of 
things we inhabit and make. But beginning design students 
experience the world the same way most people do-in dis-
traction. But things experienced are still resonant. What design 
education attempts is to call students to an awareness that rt 
is okay to care about the world. Even if such caring is not 
habitual, having grown up in the world students are predis-
posed to caring about rt, if encouraged to do so. Care for the 
world becomes possible when rts experience in distraction 
transforms into considered awareness, much as how specifici-
ty redeems abstraction through location. 
The interdependence of care and specificrty suggests that con-
structed things and their meaning are indivisible. In short rt 
appears that form is content. which challenges habrts of think-
ing that separate form from content. an example of which is 
the tendency to ascribe unexpected and arbitrary meanings 
to things that do not strictly belong to them. Heidegger elab-
orates on this in his discussion of the bridge: 
To be sure, people think of the bridge as primarily and 
really merely a bridge; after that and occasionally, it might 
express much else besides; and as such an expression it 
would then become a symbol, for instance a symbol of 
those things we mentioned before. But the bridge, if rt is 
a true bridge, is never first of all a mere bridge and then 
afterward a symbol. And just as lrttle is the bridge in the 
first place exclusively a symbol, in the sense that rt 
expresses something that strictly speaking does not 
belong to it. 16 
One of the great struggles for beginning design students is 
how to elaborate an idea basis for a project, say a bridge, and 
enrich it wrth a meaning beyond some beam-like object sim-
ply spanning between two points, an extreme abstraction of 
what bridges do when thought of simply in terms of con-
veyance. Often, when students attempt to elaborate a mean-
ing for a project rt is arbrtrary and unexpected; strictly speak-
ing this imagined meaning frequently does not belong to the 
project. Students ascribe such arbrtrary and unexpected 
meaning to their projects because they are required to do so 
as an expression of developing conceptual sophistication. The 
tendency is to imagine that any meaning ascribed to a thing is 
acceptable because rt is empty, reasonably so because form 
and content are conceived as separate. 
Unfortunately, the persuasiveness of the association between 
supposed meaning and the thing meant to carry (or contain) 
that meaning is rarely challenged. Such passivity is likely a con-
sequence of street-level radical subjectivity, which dictates that 
meaning, as much as beauty is in the eye of the beholder. 
Because the degree to which individuals in a given culture are 
able to negotiate the world of that culture precisely because 
meaning is shared rather than private, street-level radical sub-
jectivity is actually unsupportable. Heidegger believed that 
separating form from content is a characteristic of dualistic 
thinking in the West, and as such it is as much symptom as 
cause of estrangement. He writes: 
The Consequence, in the course ofWestern thought has 
been that the thing is represented as an unknown X to 
which perceptible properties are attached. From this 
point of view, everything that already belongs to the 
gathering essence of this th ing does, of course, appear as 
something that is afterward read into rt. Yet the bridge 
would never be a mere bridge if it were not a thing. 17 
Apart from the word essence, which might elicit discomfort 
in an epoch of unstable truth, this last passage gets to the 
heart of the archrtectural endeavor. As architects, we frt 
together things that are already meaningful, not so much as 
carriers of innate meaning but rather the meaning things carry 
accrues to them over a long duration in a particular culture.18 
It is a meaning that language sometimes reveals that common 
use often conceals. For example, "to bridge" suggests much 
more than simply a platform for conveyance. 'To bridge a 
gap," to "bridge communrties," or to "bridge differences," each 
suggests a kind of gathering, reconciliation, or open passage 
related to social life, or to life passages for an individual- akin 
to the gathering of river banks Heidegger describes as analo-
gizing the human predicament of mortalrty, resolved at the last 
bridge wrth death. 
Heidegger's intent in "Building Thinking Dwelling," was not to 
offer techniques for design or archrtectural production, or as 
he put rt, "This thinking about building does not presume to 
discover architectural ideas, let alone to give rules for build-
ing."19 Heidegger's disclaimer is an important caution against 
instrumentalization of his thought or attempts to identifY 
"dwelling" as a crrterion of building qualrty captured once and 
for all. Thus, using "Building Thinking Dwelling" as a lead in to a 
project requiring students to build dwelling is not at all what I 
am getting at here. Rather, Heidegger's meditation on building 
suggests how estrangement from thinking and a care for the 
world can be bridged. Only through an emerging awareness 
of and thoughtfulness about the world archrtects inhabrt and 
make (never by action, empty productivrty, or skill develop-
ment alone) could the stories beginning design students tell 
resist becoming unexpected and arbitrary attempts to attach 
perceptible properties to an unknown X. 
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